Image is of a large protest in the Ivory Coast, sourced from this article in People’s Dispatch.


This week’s megathread is based largely on a detailed article from People’s Dispatch, featuring statements and analysis from Achy Ekessi, the General Secretary of the Revolutionary Communist Party of Ivory Coast (PCRCI), brought to my attention by @jack@hexbear.net’s comment in the last megathread.

The president of Ivory Coast, the 83 year old Alassane Ouattara, is aiming for a fourth term in power while barring out much of the opposition. I can’t really do the all the history of how the situation wound up this way justice in a preamble as it’s fairly complicated (read the article if you are interested), but to summarize, Ouattara is currently the only coherent candidate for the French to support. Back in 2011, the French helped Ouattara overthrow the previous (pan-Africanist) president, Laurent Gbagbo, and then arrested him and sent him to the ICC, and he was then acquitted and released in 2021.

Gbagbo is now running against Ouattara, but his base, the working class, has large swathes that are not present on the voting rolls and so it would be unlikely for him to win. On the opposite side of the spectrum is Tidjane Thiam, a former CEO of the Swiss Bank Credit Suisse, whose base is in the richer strata of the Ivory Coast, which overlaps with Ouattara’s base. He would be more likely to win, but would certainly maintain many Western imperialist relationships. Ouattara, however, has simplified the electoral situation by simply barring both of them from running in the election at all.

Ouattara has, on paper, delivered some amount of economic development to the Ivory Coast. But as expected, most of it is funnelled to the bourgeois, as well as to foreign corporations and governments, while the working class are swallowed by the cost of living crisis. There has been significant infrastructure projects, but these have not only generated massive debt, they also have only really addressed the damage caused by the 2011 civil war and intervention by the French.

The rest of Western Africa has either entirely exited the orbit of France (Niger, Mali, Burkina Faso), are wavering/unstable (Senegal, Benin, Guinea), are beginning to show doubts (Nigeria, Ghana), or are economically weak enough to not be a major blow for the French to lose (Togo, Guinea-Bissau). The loss of the Ivory Coast would be a major setback for French neocolonialism, and be a potent example to nearby countries.


Last week’s thread is here.
The Imperialism Reading Group is here.

Please check out the RedAtlas!

The bulletins site is here. Currently not used.
The RSS feed is here. Also currently not used.

Israel's Genocide of Palestine

If you have evidence of Zionist crimes and atrocities that you wish to preserve, there is a thread here in which to do so.

Sources on the fighting in Palestine against the temporary Zionist entity. In general, CW for footage of battles, explosions, dead people, and so on:

UNRWA reports on Israel’s destruction and siege of Gaza and the West Bank.

English-language Palestinian Marxist-Leninist twitter account. Alt here.
English-language twitter account that collates news.
Arab-language twitter account with videos and images of fighting.
English-language (with some Arab retweets) Twitter account based in Lebanon. - Telegram is @IbnRiad.
English-language Palestinian Twitter account which reports on news from the Resistance Axis. - Telegram is @EyesOnSouth.
English-language Twitter account in the same group as the previous two. - Telegram here.

English-language PalestineResist telegram channel.
More telegram channels here for those interested.

Russia-Ukraine Conflict

Examples of Ukrainian Nazis and fascists
Examples of racism/euro-centrism during the Russia-Ukraine conflict

Sources:

Defense Politics Asia’s youtube channel and their map. Their youtube channel has substantially diminished in quality but the map is still useful.
Moon of Alabama, which tends to have interesting analysis. Avoid the comment section.
Understanding War and the Saker: reactionary sources that have occasional insights on the war.
Alexander Mercouris, who does daily videos on the conflict. While he is a reactionary and surrounds himself with likeminded people, his daily update videos are relatively brainworm-free and good if you don’t want to follow Russian telegram channels to get news. He also co-hosts The Duran, which is more explicitly conservative, racist, sexist, transphobic, anti-communist, etc when guests are invited on, but is just about tolerable when it’s just the two of them if you want a little more analysis.
Simplicius, who publishes on Substack. Like others, his political analysis should be soundly ignored, but his knowledge of weaponry and military strategy is generally quite good.
On the ground: Patrick Lancaster, an independent and very good journalist reporting in the warzone on the separatists’ side.

Unedited videos of Russian/Ukrainian press conferences and speeches.

Pro-Russian Telegram Channels:

Again, CW for anti-LGBT and racist, sexist, etc speech, as well as combat footage.

https://t.me/aleksandr_skif ~ DPR’s former Defense Minister and Colonel in the DPR’s forces. Russian language.
https://t.me/Slavyangrad ~ A few different pro-Russian people gather frequent content for this channel (~100 posts per day), some socialist, but all socially reactionary. If you can only tolerate using one Russian telegram channel, I would recommend this one.
https://t.me/s/levigodman ~ Does daily update posts.
https://t.me/patricklancasternewstoday ~ Patrick Lancaster’s telegram channel.
https://t.me/gonzowarr ~ A big Russian commentator.
https://t.me/rybar ~ One of, if not the, biggest Russian telegram channels focussing on the war out there. Actually quite balanced, maybe even pessimistic about Russia. Produces interesting and useful maps.
https://t.me/epoddubny ~ Russian language.
https://t.me/boris_rozhin ~ Russian language.
https://t.me/mod_russia_en ~ Russian Ministry of Defense. Does daily, if rather bland updates on the number of Ukrainians killed, etc. The figures appear to be approximately accurate; if you want, reduce all numbers by 25% as a ‘propaganda tax’, if you don’t believe them. Does not cover everything, for obvious reasons, and virtually never details Russian losses.
https://t.me/UkraineHumanRightsAbuses ~ Pro-Russian, documents abuses that Ukraine commits.

Pro-Ukraine Telegram Channels:

Almost every Western media outlet.
https://discord.gg/projectowl ~ Pro-Ukrainian OSINT Discord.
https://t.me/ice_inii ~ Alleged Ukrainian account with a rather cynical take on the entire thing.


  • Tervell [he/him]@hexbear.net
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    3 days ago

    the Pivot to Asia, except its Grandpa Simpson walking in, seeing thousands of PLA missiles pointed at him, and walking out https://archive.ph/RfUEf

    Should America’s military plan for a retreat from the Pacific?

    When America goes to war, it likes to be on the offensive. “Nobody ever defended anything successfully,” Gen. George S. Patton famously said. “There is only attack and attack and attack some more.” But for six months after Pearl Harbor, the U.S. military retreated and retreated some more. The U.S. garrison in the Philippines, under Gen. Douglas MacArthur, steadily retreated before the Japanese onslaught that culminated in the surrender at Bataan in May 1942. Isolated outposts at Wake Island and Guam fell, while the decimated and outnumbered U.S. fleet carefully stuck to hit-and-run as America mobilized for total war. Today, a U.S. Army officer has a warning: In the face of growing Chinese military power, America needs to relearn how to conduct a fighting retreat in the Pacific.

    “Fading advantages in firepower, distributed forces, and the growing operational reach of China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) require an expansion of operational thought,” wrote Maj. Patrick Smith in a recent essay for Military Review, an Army professional publication. “The joint force must consider methods of retrograde to shape advantages in time, space, and force.”

    I fucking love tactical-speak, admiral-biederman’s bits of it are barely even exaggerated, American cops and troops do genuinely talk like this. I’m expanding my operational thought dude, I’m fucking shaping my advantage in time and space!

    Smith lists several factors that imperil America’s position in the Pacific. “Small constellations of U.S. elements — ashore and afloat — encircle the looming mass of mainland China,” he wrote. “Operating on tenuous exterior lines, they are vulnerable to defeat in detail by a prodigious array of standoff munitions or blockade.” Resupply is difficult within range of Chinese weapons, reserves of personnel and munitions are scarce, and “regional partners can quickly about-face on support to U.S. forces, making presence in some locales untenable.” Smith also worries that the U.S. lacks sufficient sealift, arguing that “glaring training shortfalls in crisis response, worsened by maintenance deficiencies, compromise U.S. capacity to conduct amphibious actions.”

    Smith argues that the U.S. needs to relearn how to retreat. “Fighting withdrawals and delays will be sharpened arrows in the quiver of operational leaders campaigning in the early stages of a Pacific fight,” he wrote. “In those precarious moments, the joint force should prudently select positions from which it can absorb repeated blows while degrading enemy means.” Smith envisions a widely distributed joint force that would “confound the PLA with a targeting dilemma if it decides to switch to the offensive.” Deception operations would be key: “Similar to Grant’s illusory movements to confuse Lee, feints, demonstrations, and advances within and outside of theater may freeze enemy actions to create time and space for movement of friendly forces.” Adroit maneuvers, well-timed withdrawals and clever deception operations would exploit American strengths and Chinese weaknesses, Smith argued.

    Y’know, somehow I don’t think China’s really planning on, like, chasing the USN around and seizing random Pacific islands. If the US retreats from the closest islands and thus loses the bases that they could most effectively strike China from… then, uh, that’s pretty good for the Chinese? That’d be a pretty funny WW3 actually, the US retreats in order to bait PLAN into chasing them, and China just goes “uh, okay, cool!” and continues on as usual, with the war turning into just occasional skirmishes while Americans at home are going fucking insane from continuous seething rage-cry (and then we all get nuked, which would be more the matt-joker kind of funny). But yeah, this isn’t an invasion of Russia (with the US in the role of Russia) - a fighting retreat only works if the enemy actually chases you so you can inflict casualties on them during the process, hence the fighting part.

    The thing about distributing your forces is that you’re buying their survival with the degradation of your own offensive capability - you need a certain degree of mass to actually attack effectively. We see the ground equivalent of this in Ukraine - with drones and omnipresent ISR, it’s difficult to actually mass troops for an attack without them getting struck ahead of time, which in turn relegates combat to mostly small skirmishes, without any big-arrow moves that can make large gains. This was a factor in the failure of Ukraine’s 2023 counteroffensive, where they didn’t have the sufficient mass of troops necessary to penetrate Russian defenses - and the persistent cope among Western commentators was that the Ukrainians just decided not to do that because they were dumb morons, rather than acknowledging that maybe they simply could not do that because of the circumstances of the modern battlefield. There’s also examples of this going all the way back to WW2 - the German defense against the Normandy landings was stifled by Allied air superiority, forcing German mechanized troops to split up in smaller units and travel at night and across smaller roads in order to avoid being spotted and bombed, which slowed their repositioning to Normandy and caused them to arrive piecemeal rather than as whole coherent divisions, and thus be unable to counter-attack anywhere near as effectively.

    And the same thing can play out with naval and air operations - if you’re not sending in enough planes and missiles to actually overwhelm the enemy’s air defenses, then you’re not going to get anywhere. If you split up your fleets in smaller units so they can disperse and be less vulnerable, then each one of those new units won’t be able to hit anywhere near as hard. And additionally, resupplying a distributed force becomes much more logistically complex - the resupplies themselves are also vulnerable and need protection. Again going back to WW2, the Allies started out with lots of small convoys over the Atlantic, but later shifted to a smaller number of much larger convoys which, by featuring a greater concentration of ships, were much more capable of defending themselves against German subs. Except if you’ve distributed your force, you don’t have that option - you’ll need lots of convoys (although these days air-supply is at least a lot more viable) to reach all the small units you’ve broken up your forces into.


    … continued in comment …

    • Damarcusart [he/him, comrade/them]@hexbear.net
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      2 days ago

      “Nobody ever defended anything successfully,” Gen. George S. Patton famously said.

      I know he was probably the most anti-communist that ever anti-communisted, but does he not know about Stalingrad? About the entire eastern front of the war he is most famous for commanding forces in?

      • Tervell [he/him]@hexbear.net
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        Also, does he know about his own experience at the Battle of Metz, where his “attack and attack and attack some more” approach amounted to basically the human-wave attacks that Westerners accuse the Soviets of doing? (although admittedly, I couldn’t find a date on that quote, so it may have been from before this)

        https://bigserge.substack.com/p/the-last-effort-germanys-final-battle

        Meanwhile, farther to the south, General Patton’ 3rd Army had a damnably difficult slog trying to clear the Germans out of the Loraine Region. In particular, the Germans put up a fierce resistance at the fortress complex around Metz, and Patton’s attack - which began on September 27 - could not clear out the last pockets of resistance until December 13.

        The Lorraine Campaign became a topic of notoriety and great criticism against Patton (though today most people have never heard of it). Like the rest of the allied operations in the autumn of 1944, Patton’s assault towards Metz was nothing more than a frontal assault which generated huge casualties, with the American advance greatly complicated by both incessant rain and logistical difficulties. Patton became somewhat obsessed with Metz, which he grandly (and incorrectly) proclaimed had not been captured in centuries. However, Patton the cavalryman was completely out of his element in a grinding positional slog, and really did very little to direct the battle - he communicated only infrequently with his subordinates, rarely intervened in battle management, and generally spent most of his time griping at his command post and in his diary. He speculated that his army was being deliberately starved of fuel as a sop to Montgomery, and that the supply difficulties were somehow being manufactured to influence the presidential election back home in the USA. Meanwhile, he wrote to his wife asking her to send him Pepto-Bismol - what he called “pink medicin” - claiming that the rain and the slogging attack were giving him an excess of bile.

        love to get so fucking angry at how much I suck that I give myself acid reflux

        By any measure, the Loraine Campaign was not Patton’s finest moment. He was essentially missing in action, exerting little control over the operation, preferring to gripe and pout in his headquarters. Meanwhile, his Third Army created a meatgrinder in its assault, suffering 55,000 casualties in addition to some 42,000 “nonbattle” casualties - frostbite, sickness, trench foot, and the like. The latter in particular had become an epidemic among American troops, who found that the army regulation footwear was simply inadequate for cold or wet weather. The American quartermaster in Europe, General Robert Littlejohn, admitted that in snow the standard issue boots were “nothing but a sponge tied around the soldier’s foot.” But boots or no boots, the attack went on. When Bradley urged Patton to break off the attack on Metz - “For God’s sake, lay off it”, he said, “You are taking too many casualties for what you are accomplishing” - Patton ignored him and railed about Bradley’s timidity in his diary.

        you want me to not waste the lives of thousands of men in stupid attacks? what a fucking pussy

        one of the “greatest” American generals btw

        But Bradley had a point - Lorraine was remarkably costly to Patton’s Army. According to a 1985 US Army study of the campaign (which emphasized Patton’s indifference to overstraining his logistics) fully a third of all the casualties suffered by Patton’s 3rd Army in the entire war were incurred in Lorraine during only a three month period. Probably the most poignant summary of the autumn fighting came from a war reporter embedded with Patton’s 5th Infantry Division, which took tremendous losses reducing one of the Metz forts. He wrote, simply: “We were attempting to assault a medieval fortress in a medieval manner.” But perhaps we are being too hard on Patton - Bradley’s Operation Queen fared no better, nor were the British going anywhere fast up in the Netherlands.

        It was by any reckoning a miserable autumn, one which has been largely forgotten in the historiography simply because it seems to be such an aberration - an archaic throwback to the last war. Instead of sweeping mechanized operations, the war had devolved into ugly frontal assaults that burned through entire infantry battalions to advance 200 yards through the forest and the mud. Losses were severe enough that American units became chronically understrength, and casualties routinely outstripped replacements. Patton, in an effort to keep his frontline units as strong as possible, began rounding up rear area personnel - clerks, administrative personnel, drivers, and so forth - to be added to his rifle units after a cursory infantry training. By December, fully 10% of Patton’s rear area personnel had been thus “drafted” into the infantry. We are of course used to the idea that the Germans had to increasingly resort to emergency stopgap measures to fight the war, but the idea that the powerful American Army would have to do likewise is more troubling.


        btw, this whole “forgotten” phase of the fighting on the Western front I feel is pretty important for understanding how truly important the Soviet war effort was, especially as we’re now inundated with narratives downplaying their contribution and overplaying the Western one. This was late '44 - the Allies were facing a thoroughly depleted Germany, one which had already lost a massive amount of men (and some of their best officers, either to death or to just being fired since they displeased Hitler) and equipment on the Eastern front, and whose industrial output was being heavily reduced by bombardment. They were also trying to get past a defensive line which, while hyped up in propaganda, was in actuality quite sloppy (more from the same article):

        In theory, much of the German defense was now anchored on the infamous “Siegfried Line”, or the “West Wall” - a dense nest of German defenses erected in a sort of mirror image to France’s prewar Maginot Line. On paper, fighting on a prepared defensive line ought to have accrued significant advantages for the Wehrmacht, and indeed German propaganda relentlessly trumpeted the idea of the Reich’s impenetrable western border, defended as it was by both the West Wall and the Rhine. However, notwithstanding the obvious anachronism of an “impenetrable defensive line”, and even ignoring the obviously stark warning from Germany’s own experience in 1918, when they had lost the war despite having both the Hindenburg Line and the Rhine to defend behind, it turned out that the mighty West Wall was not all it was cracked up to be. In particular, the West Wall had several specific defects:

        • Much of the original line had been built in 1938 and 1939, designed to withstand the ordnance of the day - consequentially, many of the emplacements were simply not built to survive the much more powerful weaponry in use by 1944.
        • Many of the West Wall’s heavy weapons (particularly artillery) and equipment (like radios) had been stripped down throughout the war for use elsewhere, and in particular to equip the Atlantic Wall in France.
        • An emergency construction program designed to get the wall back into fighting shape was entrusted to domestic Nazi party officials (Gauleiter) and civilian construction crews who had no real understanding of military engineering; consequentially, the new portions of the line tended to be haphazard tangles of bunkers, pillboxes, trenches, barbed wire, and tank obstacles which were not arranged in a systematic way - for example, there was relatively little thought given to lines of sight or fields of fire.

        Thus, despite the ostensible impregnability of the West Wall, German troops found a disappointing mixture of sloppily built new fortifications and outdated prewar bunkers that would be pulverized by modern allied munitions - and underlying it all, an endemic shortage of heavy weapons, communications equipment, ammunition, mines, and men. Probably the best thing that can be said for the West Wall is that it did at least have plenty of obstacles to complicate the allied assault, and the presence of the belt helped give confidence to inexperienced Volksgrenadier units who did not know any better - green troops always feel and fight better in fixed defenses. But certainly, no German soldier with even a modicum of realism believed that they could hold the line in the west indefinitely.

        And yet… the Allies, despite their massive advantages, were still slowed down substantially and forced to take great casualties overcoming these mediocre fortifications.

        Wall to wall armies from the channel to the Alps, limited mobility, and fires-intensive frontal assaults across a broad front. If it sounds familiar, that’s because it is - and for the last three months of 1944, the Germans and the Allies would fight an attritional-positional battle reminiscent of the First World War: a gruesome homage to the war their fathers fought.

        Meanwhile, the Soviets were out doing multiple massive offensives a year, over far larger territory, wiping out entire German Army Groups.

    • Tervell [he/him]@hexbear.net
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      Nonetheless, most Americans would probably agree with Patton that the best defense is a good offense. Knowing how to retreat is important, but it’s more important to be able to absorb the enemy’s blows while inflicting your own, Eric Heginbotham, a researcher at MIT’s Center for International Studies, told Defense News. In contrast to 1941, the situation in the Pacific today “has to do largely with long-range fires and our ability to survive adversary ones while conducting our own,” Heginbotham said. The problem is that the U.S. has failed to harden its Pacific airbases against Chinese missile barrages, or ensure that U.S. forces enjoy flexible and redundant logistics that can function in the face of Chinese attacks. “This has a bit less to do with retrograde per se, than not putting our forces forward in highly vulnerable positions,” said Heginbotham. Dispersing for distributed operations can help mitigate those vulnerabilities. Nonetheless, Heginbotham agrees the U.S. military needs to know how to retrograde operations.

      No question as to why those forces are in forward positions - the US just decided to put them there since it’d be more exciting for the troops I guess? Maybe they’re in those forward positions so they can actually strike at the Chinese - and if you move them back, you also substantially reduce your capacity to actually, you know, fight. It’s like a boxer who just goes to the edge of the ring and runs away when his opponent closes in - sure, he’s not going to get punched, but you can’t actually win a match that way! Sure, today we’re inundated with missiles and standoff weapons, but those still have limited ranges, even if they are very large. The US wouldn’t be maintaining all these bases if they could just fire off missiles from the continental States with equal effectiveness!

      Ironically, despite America’s distaste for retreat, the U.S. can do this better than China. “One advantage we do enjoy in the Pacific is maritime depth and the ability to engage where and when we want,” Heginbotham said. “In contrast, the Chinese fleet is up against a continent. It has nowhere to run or hide and is, in effect, in the shooting gallery from day one.”

      Shooting gallery… but if your forces aren’t there, then, uh… who’s shooting at the Chinese? Like, what even is this argument, genuinely - we’ve been talking about has the US has opportunity to retreat and thus avoid fighting the PLAN in unfavorable engagements or getting bombed with missiles, but if they actually do that, then… the Chinese aren’t boxed in anymore and can actually leave, right? Also, the PLAN being “up against a continent” means they’re much better protected, able to benefit from being under an air defense umbrella that fleets out in the ocean don’t have, and really short resupply routes. Now of course, as per the boxing analogy, you also can’t actually damage the opponent without eventually moving out from your nice and comfy position at home, but… do the Chinese seek that out? Do they want to defeat the USN in open combat out in the middle of the Pacific, or are they simply looking to secure their own seas? Like, this whole thing seems to be based on a scenario where it’s China which attacks and tries to conquer the rest of the Pacific, and the US is playing the heroic role of (ironically) Russia, retreating into their strategic depth and making their opponent pay dearly for every bit of land (or sea) they take. But that’s based on… just nothing beyond vague orientalist notions of “well obviously they want to conquer the world!”? It’s the US which would be on the offense here, not somehow the defense.

      I also love how American military discourse must eventually always wrap around to “well sure, we have glaring issues, but, um, actually our enemies are even worse off!”

    • miz [any, any]@hexbear.net
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      3 days ago

      “The joint force must consider methods of retrograde to shape advantages in time, space, and force.”

      methods of retrograde? is this tactical speak for “retvrn” or what

      jesse-wtf

      • Tervell [he/him]@hexbear.net
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        I think they just mean retreat. Genuinely a baffling term to use in this context, “shape advantages” is at least somewhat comprehensible, but fucking going on about retrogrades like we’re doing astrology really sent me